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Abstract | Theodicies of satisficing – defenses of God’s goodness that justify creating minimally 
satisfactory beings/worlds – originate with Robert Merrihew Adams (1972, 1979). Adams (1972) 
argued that in creating imperfect beings God was graceful in giving the undeserved gift of life. There 
have been many objections to Adams’s argument; e.g., Jerome A. Weinstock (1975) objected that 
God still would have been graceful in granting undeserved life to superior beings, and, among others, 
E. Wielenberg (2004) objected that grace doesn’t erase the imperfection of creating imperfection. 
However, Adams’s theodicy arguably maintains two points: (a) non-existing superior beings cannot 
be harmed by not being created, and (b) if God must create superior beings, we wouldn’t be them. 
Setting aside whether God is justified in satisficing per se, I target one element of Adams’s satisficing 
theodicy, viz. (b), his “non-identity” thesis: we would not be the superior beings God could have cre-
ated. I argue that this thesis is inconsistent with the theology informing Adams’s theodicy. That the-
ology identifies us not as our bodies, but as our nonphysical souls. On that theology’s “identity thesis,” 
identity of subjects of experience is preserved through conception, life, death, and the after-life, and 
thus is capable of preservation in alternate bodies. Thus, God could have created us as better beings in 
a better world, exhibiting grace and avoiding imperfection. Thus, (b) cannot support God’s satisficing. 
I entertain an objection that God could create souls whose identities vary with their bodies, but reply 
that He could create souls whose identities do not vary trans-corporeally.
Research Article
Rick Repetti
Department of History, Philosophy & Political Science, Kingsborough Community College, 2001 Oriental Blvd., D-223, Brook-
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Adams’s interesting argument – that God need not create the best, that in creating us lesser beings 
God was gracious, and that we should be grateful for 
the undeserved gift of life – is standardly cited as a 
starting point in many arguments for or against satis-
ficing theodicies (see, e.g., Grover 2004, Kraay 2010, 
2011, Langtry 2008, Rowe 2004, Tucker 2015, van In-
wagen 2015). Weinstock (1975), for example, object-
ed to the grace component of Adams’s satisficing the-
odicy. Weinstock argued, among other objections, that 
even if we assume grace is a virtue and its manifesta-
tion in a world w would make w superior to a world w* 
that lacked grace, God still could create a better world 
x (with better beings) with greater grace simply by en-
abling those better beings to benefit more than the 
lesser beings in w; if that makes sense, then Adams’s 
assumption – that the satisficing involved in creating 
lesser beings is justified by the presence of grace in a 
world – would be false. It would not be what Tucker 
calls “motivated suboptimization” (2015), by which he 
means satisficing that is justified because it maximizes 
from among sets of alternatives the optimal outcomes 
available under those constraints. Wielenberg (2004) 
argues along similar lines as Tucker, though not ex-
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plicitly, in noting that the presence of grace in a world 
alone is insufficient to justify submaximizing because, 
even if Adams is right in (a), that God wrongs no 
non-existing beings in failing to create them, in fail-
ing to create optimal beings in optimal worlds, God 
manifests or exhibits imperfect motivational disposi-
tions in not optimizing beings/worlds. Intuitively, if 
the presence of God’s grace in a world w would make 
w superior to a world w* that lacked God’s grace, then 
the absence of God’s perfect motivational dispositions 
in a world w would make w inferior to a world w* that 
exhibited God’s perfect motivational dispositions. 
(For other criticisms of Adams’s argument, see, e.g., 
Coughlan 1987, Grover 2003.).
Notwithstanding the interesting character of these 
objections, I do not wish to vet them here, as I think 
they may be analyzed as more relevant to (a) above, 
the idea that God wrongs no non-existing beings in 
failing to create them, than they are to (b) above, the 
claim that we would not exist if those better beings 
were created. I think (b) has an implicit existential, 
psychological, or emotional appeal – however difficult 
it may be to characterize – that survives these ob-
jections, at least for those of us who prefer that we 
exist than that God should have created other better 
beings in better worlds, with greater grace, which 
beings would not be us. More importantly, the objec-
tions above, of Weinstock, Wielenberg, and others, 
do not get to the unnoticed flaw in the heart of Ad-
ams’s argument connected with (b): the inconsistency 
of (b), the non-identity premise in his theodicy, with 
the identity premise in his broader theology. Though 
it may not worry those lacking commitments to the 
tenets in the broader theology, if the identity thesis is 
more plausible than the non-identity thesis within the 
( Judeo-Christian) theology that informs Adams’s theod-
icy, then Adams’s theodicy collapses for those for whom 
it was formulated – likely the only ones who might 
have been moved by it.
Adams’s satisficing theodicy is a response to the prob-
lem of evil within Judeo-Christian theology. The 
problem of evil consists in the recognition that there 
is a prima facie tension between:
i. the Judeo-Christian idea that God is all-loving 
and all-powerful, and
ii. the obvious fact of the existence of massive evil 
and gratuitous suffering.
Hick’s classic theodicy is that we are better off as real 
persons with free will in a non-cartoon-like world with 
real consequences, such that our choices matter, than 
we would be otherwise as automata in a cartoon-like 
world, and evil and imperfection are necessary corol-
laries of real persons in a real world, engaged in a sote-
riological process or “soul-making” (Hick 1973). Hick 
acknowledges, however, that while his theodicy shows 
consistency between God and evil, it doesn’t justify 
the extent and magnitude of apparently gratuitous suf-
fering; thus, it fails to render plausible the idea that 
they are perfectly compatible. For this, Hick admits 
one must hope that the soteriological process contin-
ues into the afterlife (Hick 1973, 102-3), something 
Adams also appeals to (1979, 56), but this appeal begs 
the question in the context of the problem of evil, and 
is perhaps even less plausible than the flawed gener-
al theodicy it attempts to patch (Grover 2003, 161; 
Grover 2004, 113-14).
Adams’s Theodicy
Adams’s theodicy might be thought to attempt to go 
beyond the mere consistency achieved by Hick’s the-
odicy, rendering it more coherent and, presumably, 
plausible, by situating it within a more comprehensive 
explanatory framework within which created beings, 
instead of complaining about the extent and magni-
tude of their suffering, are led to appreciate their lives 
as undeserved gifts of a gracious, loving creator. Intu-
itively, while God may have been under some mor-
al constraints in choosing beings and worlds (Kraay 
2010), e.g., perhaps He may only engage in motivated 
submaximization (Tucker 2015), we cannot help but 
value our lives, and thus our very existence evidences 
the value of satisficing, to the extent we deem that our 
lives are overall worth living. Adams appeals to Leib-
niz to support the idea that our lives are worth living, 
and if anything about the evils in the past that led 
to us changed, we would not exist, which implicitly 
supports a satisficing theodicy, but he obviously does 
not entirely agree with Leibniz’s views, since Adams’s 
main point is that this need not be the best possible 
world, contra Leibniz (Adams 1979, 54-5).
Whereas Hick and others propose theodicies centered 
on free will within the sort of consequences-involving 
world required for spiritual development, or attempt 
to render coherent the idea that a morally unsurpassa-
ble being could submaximize a world (cf. Rowe 1994) 
or do so with motivation (Tucker 2015), or create all 
minimally acceptable worlds in one best possible mul-
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tiverse (Kraay 2010), among similar approaches, a di-
alectical virtue of Adams’s theodicy is that he focuses 
on another reason to think God need not have created 
us as better or perfect beings in a better world: we 
have no legitimate claim on Him that He should have 
done so, for if God were obliged to create better be-
ings, we would not be those beings. Implicitly, to press 
the claim, from Adams’s perspective, is to argue against 
our own existence! (There is a self-stultifying element, 
however inchoate, in that realization, which Adams 
(1979, 54) attributes to Leibniz, who was much more 
explicit about it.)
Adams sidesteps the more pressing dimension of the 
problem of evil, namely, imagining a plausible, co-
herent justification for gratuitous suffering. In that 
regard, Adams’s grace argument functions, howev-
er unwittingly, as a distraction, if not a red herring. 
Wielenberg (2004) implies as much when he argues 
that the presence of grace does not necessarily com-
pensate for or otherwise discount the imperfection of 
satisficing. Adams, instead of directly challenging the 
alleged inconsistency between a morally unsurpassa-
ble God and evil/imperfection, which is what Hick 
and many other theodicists do, indirectly does so by 
targeting a related idea:
(P) If a perfectly good moral agent created any 
world at all, it would have to be the very best 
world that he could create. (Adams 1972, 317)
P may be credited with generating a turn in theodicy 
literature that vets whether there can only be one best 
possible world, infinitely many unsurpassable worlds, 
or infinitely many surpassable worlds, which are a 
priori or logical questions, and which of these, if any, 
characterizes the actual world, which is at least part-
ly an a posteriori or empirical question (Rowe 1979). 
(For discussions of these ‘worlds’ issues, see Grover 
2004, Kraay 2010, 2011, Langtry 2008, Rowe 2004, 
Tucker 2015, van Inwagen 2015, Wielenberg 2004, 
and Weinstock 1975.)
To situate Adams’s critique of P within the context of 
his entire argument, let us sketch an abstract version 
of the argument, as follows:
1. If there were perfect worlds with perfect beings, 
we would not exist in those worlds because we are 
not perfect.
2. If God were morally obliged to create those 
worlds, we wouldn’t exist.
3. By creating this imperfect world, imperfect beings 
like us become possible.
4. By creating this imperfect world, God graced us 
with the undeserved gift of life.
Let us now consider how Adams seeks to undermine 
P.  Adams thinks God could create a world in which:
1. None of the individual creatures in it would exist 
in the best of all possible worlds.
2. None of the creatures in it has a life that is so mis-
erable on the whole that it would have been better 
for that creature if it had never existed.
3. Every individual creature in the world is at least 
as happy on the whole as it would have been in 
any other possible world in which it could have 
existed. (320)
Call (1)-(3) Adams’s “minimally-morally-accept-
able-world” (MMAW) criteria. Adams adduces two 
criteria to address whether an individual being satis-
fies MMAW-type criteria:
4. The creature is not, on the whole, so miserable that 
it would have been better off for him if he had 
never existed.
5. No being who came into existence in better or 
happier circumstances would have been the same 
individual as the creature in question. (327)
Call (4) and (5) Adams’s “minimally-morally-accept-
able-created-being” (MMACB) criteria, implied by 
(2) and (3), respectively.
The implicit idea in making MMAW criteria ab-
stract is that if a world relevantly similar to ours sat-
isfies MMAW criteria, God may satisfice in general, 
though perhaps not specifically in the actual world: it 
is presumably enough for an abstract satisficing the-
odicy if some world roughly similar to ours satisfies 
MMAW criteria. This abstraction is useful to separate 
two issues: whether a satisficing theodicy model case is 
coherent per se, which is a version of the a priori ques-
tion, and whether our actual world – with its peculiar 
array of egregious cases of gratuitous suffering – suf-
ficiently approximates such a model world, which is 
the a posteriori question. Whether our world matches 
up to such a possible world can be set aside, arguendo, 
while attempting to answer the a priori question, but 
only provisionally, so long as our world conceivably 
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falls within the range of nearby possible worlds that 
satisfy these criteria, or within the same “cluster” of 
worlds, as Kraay (2011) puts it, for if the distance be-
tween the actual world and such possible worlds is 
great, then the issue of such possible worlds cannot 
be used in support of a theodicy for the actual world. 
And it seems intuitive that this is a surpassable world.
One may thus reasonably resist the idea that, because 
a model-case world or world-cluster – in which a sat-
isficing theodicy is coherent – significantly resembles 
the actual world, the satisficing theodicy is cogent in 
the actual world. However, the main objection I de-
velop here does not rely on resisting this model-case-
to-actual-world move. Adams could admit that our 
world is not a model-case world without contradict-
ing his conclusion that P is false:
(P) If a perfectly good moral agent created any 
world at all, it would have to be the very best 
world that he could create. (Adams 1972, 317)
If any world satisfies MMAW criteria, regardless of 
how imperfect it may be, P is false. But P would be 
false even if the penultimate highest heaven world 
was not as perfect as the ultimate highest heaven 
world, but was reasonably construed to result from 
God’s motivated submaximization, to borrow Tuck-
er’s (2015) idea. If so, however, then showing P to be 
false is facile, and proves little that may carry over into 
a plausible satisficing theodicy for this world. Thus, 
there is a potentially huge gulf between a world that 
could falsify P and significantly lower worlds that sat-
isfy the MMAW criteria. To the extent our world sat-
isfies MMAW criteria, Adams’s argument applies to 
it, but it is not at all obvious that our world does. That 
is, mere consistency between God and evil/imperfec-
tion in one very remote possible suboptimal heaven 
world – though arguably enough to show P is false 
– is not enough to qualify the extent and magnitude 
of evil and suffering in our world as justified satisfic-
ing. Thus, Adams’s argument would fare better if some 
model-case world or worlds that his MMAW criteria 
describe turn out to be closer to ours rather than re-
motely like it, and if the MMACB criteria are true of 
most if not all beings in our world. That is a very tall 
order, but even if our world and its beings satisfy these 
criteria, my objection to Adams’s non-identity thesis 
undermines his argument.
To sketch how a world similar to our own and beings 
similar to us might satisfy MMAW and MMACB 
criteria, which we may jointly call “Adams’s satisfic-
ing criteria,” Adams adduces three cases that function 
implicitly as analogies with our own case, Cases A, B, 
and C. In Case A, a mother intentionally genetical-
ly alters her fetus, producing a handicapped child she 
avowedly would not bring into existence without the 
handicapping genetic transformation. Case B involves 
a breeder capable of breeding superior beings, say, 
puppies, who only breeds goldfish. And Case C in-
volves parents with access to genetic engineering that 
are not under an obligation to use it on their offspring.
Case A: the intentionally handicapped child
In Case A (Adams 1972, 326-29), we suppose par-
ents who so love their adopted handicapped children 
that they want one of their own, and will not have a 
non-handicapped child, so they genetically alter their 
fetus. Adams argues that this child either would not 
have existed, or would exist handicapped. A non-hand-
icapped alternate would not be created, but would be 
more like a sibling anyway, having different genes. As 
long as the handicapped child’s life is worth living, the 
parents did not wrong the child.
Bringing this child into existence seems consistent 
with Adams’s satisficing criteria, since it is plausible 
that:
(1*) This child would not exist in the best of all 
       possible worlds
(2*) This child does not have a life that is so miserable 
        on the whole that it would have been better for it 
        if it had never existed
(3*) This child is at least as happy on the whole as it 
       would have been in any other possible world in 
         which it could have existed
These three statements are crafted as instantiations of 
the MMAW criteria. Clearly, (2*) is equivalent to (4), 
and (3*) is related to (5), which this child also arguably 
satisfies. We can imagine that (2*) or (3*) may be false 
of a particular child, but all that is needed for the ar-
gument is that (1*)-(3*) and (5) be true of some such 
child. Adams thinks it is intuitive that they are true of 
this child. If so, Case A would support Adams’s con-
clusion that P is false.
Nonetheless, Case A arguably conjures the opposite 
intuition: by analogy, God has intentionally hand-
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icapped us, and since what the mother has done in 
Case A is immoral, what God has done in handicap-
ping us might be. Thus, Adams asks whether what’s 
wrong with the parents in Case A is that they violate 
the following principle (328):
(Q) It is wrong to bring into existence, know-
ingly, a being less excellent than one could have 
brought into existence. (Adams 1972, 329)
Adams thinks Q implies P because a world containing 
imperfect beings would not be a perfect world; P and 
Q imply each other, for P also implies Q insofar as 
a perfect world presumably contains only perfect be-
ings. So, if God violates Q, He thereby violates P. But 
Adams doesn’t think Q is morally correct; given their 
equivalence relations, if Q is false, so is P. Thus, Adams 
argues that Case B shows that Q is false.
Case B: the goldfish breeder
Case B (329) involves a breeder who is able to breed 
superior species, but breeds goldfish, who cannot 
complain that the breeder did not breed puppies, 
because they would not be those puppies; nor can 
non-existing puppies be harmed. Adams considers 
the question: Does the breeder wrong non-existing 
pups by not creating them? No, only existing beings 
can be wronged. A related question is: Can the breed-
er transform the fish into dogs? Adams’ reply would 
be that, even if this were possible in some sense, this 
would produce different creatures. This conclusion ac-
cords with his non-identity thesis; Adams’s reasoning 
about changes in bodies entailing changes in identity 
is made more explicitly elsewhere (1979, 56), but may 
be surmised from his examples here.
To make the analogy more intuitive between goldfish 
and puppies, on one hand, and us and better versions 
of ourselves, on the other, respectively, let us consider 
beings like us, say, siblings with greater cognitive en-
dowments. It seems obvious goldfish cannot survive as 
the same beings if turned into puppies, but we might 
think we can survive as the same beings if turned into 
superior versions of ourselves – versions the differenc-
es between which are not like those between members 
of radically different species, but more like the sorts of 
differences that might obtain between siblings with 
lesser and greater cognitive endowments. This makes 
some sense, given how we already have ways of mak-
ing piecemeal changes to ourselves without altering 
our identity.
Thus, if my mother got pregnant one month earlier or 
later than when she got pregnant with me, then that 
pregnancy would not involve the egg and sperm that 
produced me, but it would produce instead someone 
that would count more as a sibling (if I could, per im-
possibile, be imagined as existing in some abstract sense 
though the egg that produced me was never insemi-
nated): “My identity is established by my beginning. It 
has been suggested that no one who was not produced 
from the same individual egg and sperm cells as I was 
could have been me” (Adams 1979, 56). Even identi-
cal twins, beings from the same zygote with identical 
genetic material, are not the same person, numerically 
– not even conjoined twins. So, any deviation from the 
egg and sperm that produced me (or that specifical-
ly divided when it did into my hypothetical identical 
twin) would produce something more like a sibling, 
who would not be me. It follows we cannot complain 
we weren’t made as better beings, because such beings 
wouldn’t be us. If better beings were required to be 
created, we would not exist – they would. This conclu-
sion supports the implications of Cases A and B.
If this does not reveal the violation of Q to be the 
problem with Case A, then what is? To answer this 
question, Adams turns to Case C (Adams 1972, 329-
30).
Case C: genetically engineering our children
The atheist objects that if God exists, He’d have made 
us, and the world, better. Given God’s attributes, He 
should have, but His not doing so contradicts His 
omnibenevolence. Case C involves the parental avail-
ability of genetic engineering, which Adams claims 
nobody is obliged to use. If we fail to use it to en-
hance our offspring, we clearly violate Q. But thinking 
carefully about Case C suggests that it’s obviously not 
immoral to refuse to genetically engineer our chil-
dren. In fact, it seems to be a prima facie case that it is 
more obviously morally permissible not to genetically 
engineer our children than it is morally permissible 
to genetically engineer them. If this is correct, Adams 
implies, Q is false. If Q is false, that would seem to 
vindicate God for not creating us as the best versions 
of ourselves while still being who we are, by divine 
means analogous to genetic engineering, since God 
does violate Q. Cases A, B, and C together show that 
in creating lesser beings, God need not have wronged 
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those beings, so long as they satisfy MMACB criteria 
in MMAWs. Cases A-C suggest it is conceivable that 
a world like ours satisfies these criteria.
But then what does Adams think is wrong with the 
parents in Case A? They have done the reverse of 
genetically engineering their child, to be less than it 
would have been (setting aside Adams’s insistence that 
the pre- and post-genetically-altered cases are not the 
same individual, an unnoticed consequence of which 
is that when they altered fetus1, producing fetus2, they 
killed fetus1 for the sake of fetus2). Adams claims that 
what is wrong in Case A is that the parents violate R: 
(R) It is wrong for human beings to cause, know-
ingly and voluntarily, the procreation of an off-
spring of human parents which is notably defi-
cient, by comparison with normal human beings, 
in mental or physical capacity. (Adams 1972, 329)
R evades the question of identity in the pre- and 
post-altering fetus in Case A. Adams notes that R 
seems ad hoc, but emphasizes that R is consistent 
with Judeo-Christian ethics. According to that theol-
ogy, God was gracious in creating us lesser, undeserv-
ing beings; this is presumably like the graciousness 
of parents who do not abort fetuses known to have 
debilitating congenital defects. Rather than complain 
about our suboptimal status, we ought to be grateful 
to receive the undeserved gift of life. Thus, the reli-
gious reason Case A is reprehensible is that the par-
ents, violating R, took matters into their own hands 
and genetically reduced this potential person into one 
that possibly lacks abilities requisite to enter a two-
way relationship with God, violating God’s plan for 
that being. (On this being God’s plan for us, see Hick 
1973, 43-4.) (Again, technically, if Adams is right 
about the non-identity of fetus1 and fetus2, then the 
parents killed and sacrificed the first potential person 
to create a lesser being in its place.)
Some more serious problems with Adams’s argument
Adams’s R-violation account carries no weight with 
nonbelievers. For the nonbeliever, this case is repre-
hensible, so it cannot be solely for a reason she cannot 
recognize. We need not articulate nonreligious moral 
reasons that might explain what’s wrong with Case 
A, but Adams must, though he doesn’t. This matters 
because Adams’s theodicy is supposed to render co-
herent to believers and nonbelievers alike the idea that 
a perfect being created our imperfect world; thus, ap-
peal to beliefs that cannot engage both disputants beg 
the question, and amount to preaching to the choir.
Additionally, the nonbeliever is not given a reason she 
can recognize as valid for why God – equivalent to 
the parents – is not violating a principle analogous to 
R. Thus, R remains ad hoc even if it works within the 
theology to which Adams appeals to support the oth-
er side of the analogy. R is ad hoc because God theo-
retically sets the standards for what R means regarding 
deficiencies relative to ‘normal’ human beings when He 
created us in this world, unlike the parents, since there 
are no God-independent ‘normal’ standards against 
which to compare us. Adams needs to adduce a Q-like 
principle, Q*, that God does not violate, but it is un-
clear he can.
If the reversal of the analogy (applied to God) cannot 
be blocked because of the asymmetry and the ad hoc 
issue, then Case C becomes suspicious because it is 
unclear it can apply on the other side of the analogy, 
with God’s not violating some Q* in failing to make 
us better beings. It makes sense for us to be leery of 
genetically altering our children to improve them, but 
God has no such reservations, so God is not immune 
to Q*, even if we are immune to Q. Thus, showing 
a case in which Q is false is as facile as adducing a 
case in which P is false, but therefore does not have 
the desired satisficing justification. Without the sort 
of principled grounds on which to block these ob-
jections, we can object now that we could have been 
made better beings, with more resilient bodies, brains, 
dispositions, etc., and God could figure out a way to 
do so and preserve our identities; we will make this 
objection forcefully in the remainder of this paper.
While Adams has not identified what is wrong with 
Case A from a neutral perspective or offered reasons 
to block the analogies in Cases B and C from turn-
ing back against God, Adams can still insist Case B 
establishes that were God to create better beings, they 
would not be us, as puppies cannot be goldfish. God is 
graceful, so we should be grateful for the undeserved 
gift of life. For Adams, following Leibniz (Adams 
1979), the question is: Are our lives worth living or 
are we better off not existing at all?
The question is: Who are we?
I think the relevant question is: Were God to make 
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us better beings, would they necessarily not be us? Re-
call Weinstock’s objection to Adams, that any world 
in which God created undeserving beings would be 
one in which God’s grace could manifest, not just 
satisficed worlds (Weinstock 1975). Thus, God could 
create perfect beings, arguably, with grace, since: any 
created beings cannot exert desert claims prior to ex-
istence; thus, they would be undeserving; and, thus, by 
creating them God would manifest grace. Likewise, 
they may be grateful for their lives. Given that their 
greater ability to benefit, which follows from their 
greater perfection, outweighs our lesser ability to ben-
efit, it seems God should have created more perfect 
rather than less perfect beings. Additionally, a God 
who brings into existence the greatest beings is un-
surpassable in dispositions towards perfection, where-
as a God who fails to bring into existence the best 
possible beings would be surpassable insofar as dis-
positions toward ideal states of affairs are concerned, 
an imperfection for which grace is not compensatory 
(Wielenberg 2004, 52).
This leaves only one move for Adams’s satisficing the-
odicy: the idea that we would not be such beings. This 
claim has a subtle existential, psychological, emotional 
force insofar as we value our own lives and want it to 
be us who might have been more perfect beings, or 
insofar as we, believing Adams’s theodicy, are grateful 
for our imperfect lives. We would likely drop the com-
plaint, as Leibniz implies (Adams 1975), if pressing 
it required God to create perfect beings but not us. 
Technically, however, if the argument that God must 
create better beings in a better world is cogent, but 
the facts support the idea that this world and its be-
ings are not so, then our desire to exist cannot alter 
that qua objection to satisficing theodicy, despite how 
contradictory it may be from some vantage defined by 
our emotions and existential predicament. In other 
words, the handicapped child can complain that its 
parents shouldn’t have altered the fetus that produced 
him, despite the fact that, if they had adhered to his 
objection earlier on, he would not exist.
Adams argues that God need not have created us as 
perfect beings in a perfect world because such beings 
would not be us, any more than goldfish can com-
plain that God could have made them as puppies: 
God could create perfect beings or puppies, but they 
wouldn’t be us or goldfish, respectively; they would be 
other beings. That argument purportedly grounds the 
dialectically non-neutral (theological) claim that we 
imperfect beings ought to be thankful for the gift of 
life.
The question here is not about whether dogs and gold-
fish could share diachronic identity, nor is it “What are 
identity conditions for human beings?” The question 
for Adams is: What are the identity conditions for any 
person within the Judeo-Christian theological system 
that frames his theodicy? A central premise of Adams’ 
theological framework is that who we are – our true 
identity from the Abrahamic theological perspective 
– is not our imperfect bodies, regardless of Adams’s 
(distracting) appeals to Leibniz’s unique metaphys-
ics (Adams 1979). In Adams’s Judeo-Christian the-
ology, who we are, essentially, is immortal souls. We 
need not advance here the many arguments that have 
been presented against the coherence of the concept 
of an immaterial, nonphysical essence that somehow 
causally interacts with our brains and bodies, how my 
soul doesn’t interact with your brain, and so on. These 
questions are the source of well-worn objections that 
date back to ancient India (Federman 2010), where 
non-orthodox philosophical schools such as Carvaka 
and Buddhism challenged similar Vedic beliefs in the 
ātman (soul) (Nagapriya 2004, Garfield 2015). But 
these questions are unnecessary here. For even if the 
soul-concept was coherent, this would not help Ad-
ams, for if who we are is souls, then God could have 
given us better bodies in a better world, and we would 
still be us.
This “we’re souls” objection undermines (5), the 
non-identity thesis. From this perspective, there is no 
way to block the inference that God violates P and 
Q, and some equivalent of R that may be adduced by 
extrapolation from P, Q, R, and the reasoning above, 
say R*:
(R*) It is wrong for a perfect moral agent to cause, 
knowingly and voluntarily, the creation of a hu-
man notably deficient by comparison with ideal 
human beings in mental or physical capacity
Note that R* may be considered a non-satisficing cri-
terion for an omnibenevolent God, unless God can 
create supra-human beings with the same souls; if so, 
then R* could be a satisficing criterion, and some ver-
sion of it, say R**, could capture the greater require-
ment.
(R**) It is wrong for a perfect moral agent to 
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cause, knowingly and voluntarily, the creation 
of a being notably deficient by comparison with 
ideal beings in mental or physical capacity.
Since most humans appear not to be in the range of 
ideal human beings, God violates R* in most cases; 
God probably violates R** in the case of most sentient 
beings known to us, as the animal kingdom is a rela-
tively ruthless hell by even human standards.
In affording Adams a charitable interpretation, I sug-
gested earlier that it might be enough if a neighboring 
cluster of possible worlds and possible beings satis-
fies Adams’s satisficing criteria, though actual beings 
in our world may not satisfy those criteria in this or 
that – implicitly unrepresentative – case. This accession 
may now be retracted. For, in light of the fact that we 
are supposed to be souls, God violates R* and R**, this 
world contains beings the majority of which represent 
instantiations of God’s failure with respect to R* and 
R**, and thus God does not even satisfy Adams’s sat-
isficing criteria.
The actual world is not neighboring some possible 
world – nor, as Kraay would put it, in a world-cluster 
(Kraay 2011) – in which God satisfies Adams’s satis-
ficing criteria. As Grover argued, “unless we already 
have in place a robust theodicy that offers either ex-
planations for or justifications of some of the world’s 
most significant evils, we have little reason to believe 
that this world satisfies [such] conditions” (Grover 
2003, 146). Thus, the hedges put in place to afford 
Adams’s satisficing argument the most charitable in-
terpretation cannot block the fatal implications, iron-
ically, of the idea that we are souls.
Possible replies
To resist this fatal “we’re souls” objection, Adams 
would have to either deny the existence of the soul or 
its associated identity thesis. Although the Buddhist 
no-soul doctrine might be an interesting avenue to 
explore, I suspect Adams would be inclined if not wis-
er to let go of this particular attempt at theodicy than 
to let go of his belief in the soul, just as Euthyphro was 
inclined, and wiser, to let go of his definition of piety 
instead of his polytheism when the two were shown 
by Socrates to contradict each other. If there’s no soul, 
Adams’s theological framework collapses, with Hick’s 
fallback afterlife position. Thus, soul-denial is not a 
viable option for Adams, Hick, or like-minded theists.
One might argue that for the sorts of changes under 
consideration (e.g., radical change of fetal genetics), 
the theist can say that there are different souls in the 
pre- and post-altered fetal bodies. Perhaps it is an im-
plausible or odd claim, but the theist can argue that it 
is less implausible or odd to say this than to say that 
the soul of a goldfish could have been in a bulldog. 
Unlike soul-denial, therefore, soul-difference cannot 
be rejected outright; thus, soul-difference deserves a 
developed response.
Counter-reply: stem souls, and what it’s like to be a 
transubstantiated bat
The theist can object that it seems odd to think the 
soul of a goldfish could be the same soul as that of a 
bulldog after some sort of phi-fi (philosophical fic-
tion) soul-body-transfer; likewise, she can object that 
we could still be us in better bodies/worlds. She can 
argue that souls in radically different species could be 
constituted differently, somewhat loosely describable 
as “soul-species,” to back up that intuition. However, 
while species-type differences in soul-types might be 
metaphysically possible, there is little to no basis for it 
within the theology that frames Adams’ theodicy, in 
which case it would be a transparently ad hoc emen-
dation. And while it occurs within a different theology, 
Hindu reincarnation theory rejects the intuition that 
the soul of a goldfish cannot subsequently inhabit the 
body of a dog or human; to the contrary, reincarnation 
is believed to involve embodiment up and down the 
evolutionary scale (Nagapriya 2004).
However, even if there are non-interchangeable 
soul-species, this would not help Adams. For even 
if there are non-interchangeable soul-species-based 
metaphysical constraints that render it metaphysically 
impossible for God to take the soul of a goldfish and 
place it in the body of a dog, the variation between 
ordinary and superior humans is not nearly as great as 
that between goldfish and dogs, and humans all – on 
this option – have human-species-souls. Thus, even 
if there were non-interchangeable species-souls, pre-
sumably all members of a species could be constituted 
by them, regardless of where their embodied attributes 
fell along the spectrum of deficient, normal, and supe-
rior members of that species. Thus, all human-species 
souls could maintain identity if placed in superior hu-
man-species bodies.
To block this, Adams would have to argue that each 
Science, Religion & Culture
December 2015 | Volume 2 | Issue 4 | Page 123                                                      
                              
individual has not merely a species-soul but an indi-
vidual-type soul, a unique soul identity. That means, 
not just a numerically distinct human-type soul, but 
a qualitatively distinct individual-type soul, a meta-
physical signature above and beyond the numerical 
uniqueness of being this human-souled subject of ex-
perience versus that one. But the only way that could 
be cashed out would be if individual-type souls were 
not qualitatively equivalent. But if we weren’t, the (un-
equal) differences between us would seem arbitrary, 
given that they are undeserved. This might be a sur-
mountable problem.
However, one might argue that while it is conceivable 
or possible that God could make individual-souls, that 
isn’t the same as God being restricted to doing so, and 
there are no reasons to think He is so restricted. To the 
contrary, if He could do that, He could also do this: 
He could make qualitatively identical but numerically 
distinct human-type souls. Within the broader dual-
istic metaphysics and theology that informs Adams’s 
theodicy, most importantly, God is even capable of 
creating what I’ll call “stem-souls,” the soul equiva-
lents of stem cells. Like stem cells, stem-souls are 
proto-type souls composed of undifferentiated soul 
substance, numerically distinct but qualitatively iden-
tical until put through an individuation process and 
developmental sequence in which they become qual-
itatively differentiated when embodied in different 
psychophysical configurations (minds/bodies), only 
after which they acquire soul-species-differentiated 
characteristics. Such ontic essences acquire differen-
tiation, but are otherwise equal as pure subjects of ex-
perience. If these are possible, and they seem possible 
within Adams’s theological metaphysics, then it seems 
Adams’s satisficing theodicy ultimately fails.
The theological metaphysics behind Adams’s theod-
icy is dualistic, and thus it is reasonable to think that 
God, in creating a stem-soul, could make it the sub-
ject of experience, that mysterious thing about which 
one might wonder what it is like to be it, such as the 
experiencing subject that is a bat (Nagel 1974). If God 
has the power to transubstantiate anything, such as to 
convert the metaphysically mundane essence of oth-
erwise ordinary bread into the sacred Eucharist, or 
turn water molecules into wine molecules, inter alia, 
then God has the power to create a stem-soul that 
is the same subject of experience that could be made 
into an ordinary human or into an extraordinary one, 
and even into a goldfish, dog, or bat while remain-
ing the same subject of experience. Arguably, this is 
plausible if the concept of a soul is plausible. Certain 
Hindu philosophies hold that every being is eternal 
stem-soul substance (the ātman) that reincarnates 
and is the bearer of its previous karma. It is the same 
subject of experience throughout its transmigrational 
journey through countless bodies/species: some of us 
may have actually known, therefore, in previous lives, 
what it is like to be a bat.
Arguably, to appeal to materialist intuitions in which 
identity conditions completely supervene on bodily 
ones – e.g., in doubting that a goldfish mind or soul 
could occupy a dog body – as a ground for rejecting 
identity conditions on the soul level is, first, dialecti-
cally asymmetrical, and second, from the theological 
vantage, to beg the question against God’s abilities 
and against the very notion of a soul. Thus, the at-
tempt to protect Adams’s theodicy from the failure of 
his non-identity premise is at least prima facie incon-
sistent with the theological metaphysics that purports 
to ground that theodicy: the dualist cannot consist-
ently appeal to materialist identity criteria to defend 
dualism against objections to its dualistic identity 
criteria. That amounts to losing track of whether an 
objection is a pro or a con, or upon whom the burden 
of proof falls.
Conclusion, for theists and non-theists
I have argued that Adams’s theodicy is subject to a 
number of problems, chief among them the fact that 
it collapses on its own reliance on the issue of what 
makes an individual who or what that individual is. 
Whereas Adams thought his non-identity condition 
could ground the claim that if God were required to 
make better versions of us, they wouldn’t be us and 
we wouldn’t exist, on analysis of the identity condition 
that constitutes a central tenet of the theology within 
which Adams’s theodicy is constructed, that identity 
condition is the soul. Once the soul is acknowledged 
as such, the rest of Adams’s satisficing theodicy of 
grace unravels.
But one need not buy into the theological metaphys-
ics of the soul to reject Adams’s non-identity thesis 
and thus to reject his satisficing theodicy. For Adams’s 
genetic argument about pre- and post-altering fetal 
non-identity is weak even from a non-theological 
vantage: if the fetus before the alteration is a subject 
of experience, and remains a subject of experience 
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through and after the alterations, then arguably it is 
the same subject of experience and thus the same be-
ing (not unlike the case in which a subject of expe-
rience remains throughout amnesia or other disrup-
tions in its more complex sense of self ), even if its 
acquired identity differs from its inherited identity. 
It is a biomedical fact that fetuses have the sort of 
brain activity associated with sentience fairly early on 
in the first trimester. It is also a fact that organisms 
in the actual world can undergo small-scale genetic 
engineering while remaining subjects of experience. 
Thus, not only is the answer to the a priori question 
unsupportive of Adams’s generic satisficing theodicy 
of grace, but simple facts about actual beings suggest 
that the answer to the a posteriori question does not 
support the idea that this is a MMAW or that we 
are MMACBs. There may be other ways to ground 
satisficing theodicies, but Adams’s non-identity thesis 
is not one of them.
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